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ABSTRACT
Traditionally, the theft loss deduction for Federal income tax was limited in
several ways. The limitations included requiring that the theft be
considered a theft under the state law in which the theft occurred and that
there be direct privity between the person committing the theft and the
person against whom the theft occurred. The restrictions have made it hard
to use the theft loss deduction in most securities fraud cases. This Article
examines the history of the theft loss deduction and recent changes that
may show a relaxing of some of these restrictions, and how these changes
may impact allowing for the theft loss deduction in securities fraud cases.
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INTRODUCTION
For a loss to be considered a theft to receive theft loss treatment for
federal taxation, case law has traditionally held that two elements must be
present. First, the loss must arise from an action that would meet the
definition of “theft” in the state in which the theft loss occurred. The
second element that traditionally must be present for the loss to be a “theft”
is that there must be direct privity between the person claiming the theft
loss and the person who committed the theft. Losses for investment fraud
are generally precluded from theft loss treatment when the investor
purchased the investment through a stockbroker, rather than directly from
the perpetrator of the fraud. Despite being a violation of federal securities
law, losses for investment fraud are precluded because usually they do not
meet the state law definition of a theft, and the state common law definition
of theft includes the requirement of direct privity.
A new development came in the form of a case recently decided in the
United States Court of Federal Claims, Goeller v. United States, which
permitted the use of the federal common law definition of theft to allow
theft treatment of the investment loss, resulting in theft loss treatment.1
Goeller was in contrast with state court and federal court decisions in
which theft losses were denied because purchases were made through
stockbrokers, and no direct privity with the fraudster existed under state
law. Prior decisions required the use of state definitions of theft, and the
examination of the law of the state in which the theft occurred.2 Because
these definitions required intent as an element, direct privity was seen as an
element of a theft. However, the logic of the Goeller decision may allow
for an easing of the privity rule in investment fraud cases, permitting the
use of the theft loss deduction in cases in which an intermediary is used as
well.
There are inherent inequities in the law as it stands now. Most
securities transactions involve an intermediary, and there is often a minimal
tax recovery for the victims. Additionally, Goeller may allow for
differential treatment for a theft victim who chooses to have a district court,
1. Goeller v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 534, 540–41 (2013).
2. See e.g. United States v. Selders, 797 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150-51 (D. Mass. 2009).
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rather than the Federal Claims Court, hear his or her case. This could lead
to forum shopping by taxpayers.
This Article discusses the tax treatment anomaly where taxpayers who
purchased securities directly from a company and fell victim to securities
fraud may have better tax treatment than those who purchased securities
through a broker. Part I explores the genesis of the judicially created state
law requirement and the direct privity rule’s application as to theft loss
deductions. Part I-A discusses the process by which theft losses are
calculated. In Part I-B, this Article examines safe harbor provisions for
some victims, and in Part I-C the incentive to file for theft loss treatment
over capital loss treatment is explained.
Part II presents the traditional elements of state law and probes the
definition—and consequences thereof—of “theft” under state laws in Part
II-A. Part II-B examines the meaning of intent. In Parts II-C and II-D, this
Article examines the current direct privity requirement and its possible
exceptions. Part II-E argues that victims of securities fraud who purchase
securities through a third party broker suffer disparate harm and calls for a
reexamination of the law. In Part III, this Article discusses cases that have
been decided in the wake of Goeller and the inconsistencies that remain.
Finally, this Article concludes with the recommendation that the law be
clarified either by statute or through common law to formally allow victims
of securities fraud to be allowed access to the theft loss treatment for
federal income taxes.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL APPLICATION OF THE THEFT LOSS DEDUCTION

Section 165(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC or Code) allows a
tax deduction for “any loss sustained during the taxable year and not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise.”3 The deduction is further
defined by section 165(c)(3) of the IRC which states that “[i]n the case of
an individual, the deduction under subsection (a) shall be limited to—
. . . losses of property not connected with a trade or business or a
transaction entered into for profit, if such losses arise from fire, storm,
shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.”4 However, theft is not further
defined under section 165(c)(3) of the Code, and has generally been
interpreted judicially, using state laws.
Edwards v. Bromberg5 presents one example of judicial interpretation
of a state law definition of theft. In Edwards, the court defined theft loss
3. I.R.C. § 165(a) (2012).
4. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (emphasis added).
5. Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956).
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broadly as any criminal appropriation of another’s property by swindling,
false pretenses, or any other form of guile.6 Thefts include blackmail,
embezzlement and other frauds, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, larceny,
robbery, and threats, and they are generally treated similarly to casualty
losses for tax purposes.7 Traditionally, “theft loss” is defined under the law
of the state or foreign country where it occurred as an illegal taking that is
performed while possessing criminal intent.8 Thefts do not include lost
property or seizure or confiscation of property by a foreign government.9
Sometimes, however, what constitutes a theft is less clear. For
example, losses on deposits from insolvent financial institutions may be
treated as a casualty loss, an ordinary loss, or as a non-business bad debt.
The tax-deductible amount of the loss is the lower of the change in fair
market value (FMV) or the taxpayer’s basis reduced by insurance and other
reimbursements, if any.10 Other reimbursements may include money
received from government agencies as compensation for the theft loss
received, the amount collectible from court awards for damages net of
necessary expenses including attorneys’ fees, and funds from an employer
to mitigate the loss.11 Gifts from relatives and friends are also excluded
from the theft loss calculation.12
To deduct a theft loss, the taxpayer must have property that can
actually be taken, like investments. The mere promise that an asset exists
is not property, and would not normally qualify for a theft loss. Similarly,
an indirect effect of casualties and thefts, such as reduction in the resale
value of property, would not normally produce a deductible casualty loss.13
Theft losses are deductible in the year the theft is discovered, or later,
when there is no reasonable prospect of recovery after examining all facts

6. Id. at 110.
7. See generally I.R.C. § 162 (2012) (property used in a trade or business); I.R.C.
§ 212 (income producing property such as that used by employees and investments); I.R.C.
§ 165(c)(3) (casualty losses on personal use property); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.165-8(d)
(2015).
8. See Rev. Rul. 72-112, 1972-1 C.B. 60, 61 for U.S. theft losses requiring application
of state law. For foreign thefts, see First Chi. Corp. v. Comm’r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2089,
2097 (1995). As discussed infra, the interpretation that for there to be a theft under section
165(c)(3) there has to be a theft as defined in the jurisdiction where the theft occurred has
been called into question.
9. Powers v. Comm’r, 36 T.C. 1191, 1192–93 (1961).
10. Reimbursements are shown net of expenses to obtain reimbursement.
11. I.R.C. § 102(c) (2012).
12. Rev. Rul. 64-329, 1964-2 C.B. 58, 59.
13. See Pulvers v. Comm’r, 407 F.2d 838, 839 (9th Cir. 1969).
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and circumstances.14 The court may consider subjective factors during its
assessment, but a subjective factor “cannot be ‘the controlling or sole
criterion.’”15 Objective factors may include the existence of a claim or
litigation and the availability of restitution.16 Where there is a reasonable
prospect of recovery, the loss is sustained in “the taxable year in which it
can be ascertained with reasonable certainty whether or not such
reimbursement will be received.”17 A recovery may come from a third
party, such as an insurer, and a taxpayer must make reasonable efforts to
recover the stolen property including filing for appropriate insurance
reimbursements.18 A prospect for recovery must be reevaluated each year
to determine when that prospect is no longer reasonable.19 If, subsequent to
the theft discovery, enough years pass with a reasonable prospect of
recovery, bona fide theft loss claims may be barred under the statute of
limitations.20 Further, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) can deny a
deduction if it feels that there is an unreasonable delay beyond the
three-year statute of limitations.21 Where only a partial recovery is
reasonable, as where insurance recoveries are limited by contract, the
taxpayer may take only the unrecoverable portion as a deductible loss.22
Where the taxpayer used a larger than expected reimbursement in
estimating a casualty loss, the amount that the loss understatement should
14. See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2)(i) (2015); see also Geisler v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1734, 1736 (1988). The burden of proof for no “reasonable prospect of recovery”
falls on the taxpayer. See Gale v. Comm’r, 41 T.C. 269, 276 (1963).
15. Adkins v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 797, 807 (2013) (quoting Boehm v. Comm’r,
326 U.S. 287, 292 (1945)).
16. See, e.g., Huey v. Comm’r, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 430, 434 (1985). However, filing. a
proof of claim in bankruptcy and other ministerial acts are not a strong indicator of
recovery. Jensen v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 543, 547 (1993); see also Adkins, 113 Fed.
Cl. at 807. In Schneider v. Commissioner, a lawsuit was filed, but the perpetrator had no
assets from which to recover. Schneider v. Comm’r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1032, 1034 (1985).
The court found the lack of assets more persuasive than the presence of a lawsuit. Id. at
1034–35.
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(3); see also Jeppsen v. Comm’r, 128 F.3d 1410, 1414
(10th Cir. 1997).
18. I.R.C. § 165(h)(4)(E) (2012).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2).
20. See Wagnon v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 146 F.3d 764 (10th Cir. 1998).
21. Woltman v. United States, 56 A.F.T.R.2d. (RIA) 5860, 586263 (S.D. Cal. 1985).
Woltman could have avoided this result by filing a formal disclaimer of any recovery in the
year the theft was discovered and claimed the theft loss then. Id. at 5863; see also Treas.
Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2)(i) (2015).
22. Bubb v. United States, 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,572 at 89,81719 (W.D. Pa.
1993). But see Kaplan v. United States, 2008-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,117, at
83,13637 (M.D. Fla. 2007).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law,

5

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1

6

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

be included with other losses in the year that the taxpayer can reasonably
expect no further reimbursement.23 Where an estimated net casualty loss is
deducted in one year and an unexpected insurance or property recovery is
made in a later year, the taxability of the subsequent recovery is limited to
the tax benefits received on those losses to-date and the earlier year’s tax
return is unaffected. If the amount of the reimbursements received is more
than the taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the stolen property, a gain will be
included as ordinary income up to the amount of the loss taken for the
property in earlier years, and the rest will generally be a capital gain, but
this situation is unusual in investment fraud.24
Where a taxpayer has multiple casualties in a tax year, and those
casualties are clearly separable, they are treated as separate casualties.
When two or more taxpayers incur a loss from the same casualty, the
casualty loss rules apply separately to the losses of each individual, except
where the taxpayers are filing jointly, in which case the loss is treated as
one loss.25 Theft losses are not subject to itemized deduction phase-out
rules.26
A. Calculating a Theft Loss
The amount of the theft loss is the lower of the decrease in FMV or
the taxpayer’s basis in the property.27 FMV is “[t]he amount at which
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.”28 In the case of theft, there is
generally no FMV after the property is stolen. The costs of documenting a
theft loss and determining the taxpayer’s tax liability from the theft do not
increase the amount of the theft loss, but are deductible as a miscellaneous
itemized deduction subject to the 2% of Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)
floor.29
23. If the $100 floor was applied to the casualty loss in a previous year, as would be the
case of personal-use property for individuals, the corrected loss need not be reduced by
$100 floor again, but would be subject to the 10% limitation of the later year. I.R.C.
§ 165(h)(2)(A)(ii).
24. I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(b) (2012). Where the taxpayer has a casualty gain, the taxpayer
may be able to postpone reporting the gain by reinvesting the proceeds. Note that no $100
per incident floor applies to gains. Id.
25. If spouses file separately, each spouse is subject to a $100 floor for each casualty.
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(4)(iii) (2015).
26. I.R.C. § 68(c)(3) (2012).
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(1)(i).
28. Fair Market Value, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
29. I.R.C. § 67(b)(3) (2012).
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A net operating loss (NOL) might result where a theft loss deduction
for the year is more than income.30 NOLs for individuals are normally
carried back to offset taxes paid in the last two years and then carried
forward to reduce taxes for up to twenty years.31 However, individuals may
elect to forego carryback.32
B. Examining Safe Harbor Provisions for Qualified Ponzi Scheme
Victims
Ponzi scheme victims have additional help from Revenue Ruling
2009-9,33 where a theft loss is claimed in the year of discovery, regardless
of whether a partial recovery might result. Under this ruling, the amount of
the theft loss is equal to the amount of the original basis plus the previous
dividend and capital gain income declared and reinvested in the scheme,
less the amount recovered to date.34 This ruling simplifies accounting for
the loss because the taxpayer avoids having to amend previous years’ tax
returns for the phantom dividend and capital gain income where the statute
of limitations is still open. The taxpayer also avoids losing the tax on the
phantom income where the statute of limitations for the refund has already
been barred.35 It also does not delay the theft loss for ongoing
investigations that might produce minimal recoveries.
Revenue Procedure 2009-20 provides an optional safe harbor for
qualified investors suffering a loss that arose under a Ponzi scheme.36 A
qualified investor is a taxpayer who transferred funds to the “lead figure”
who promoted a “specified fraudulent arrangement” which caused an
investment loss.37 These investors may deduct their losses in the year of
the discovery of the fraud, without regard to whether any of the investment
may ultimately be recoverable.38 The specified fraudulent arrangement
must be a Ponzi scheme; other frauds do not qualify.39 Conviction of a
crime is not necessary to show fraud, provided the lead figure is: (1)
indicted for fraud, embezzlement, or other theft loss; or (2) the subject of
an ongoing state or federal criminal complaint where that complaint: (a)

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

I.R.C. § 172(d)(4)(C) (2012).
I.R.C. § 172(b).
Rev. Rul. 2009-9, 2009-14 I.R.B. 735, 736.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rev. Proc. 2009-20, 2009-14 I.R.B. 749.
Id. § 4.03, at 750.
Id. § 5.01(2), at 751.
Id. § 2, at 749.
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alleged an admission by the lead figure; (b) the assets of the arrangement
have been frozen; or (c) a receiver/trustee was appointed with respect to the
assets of the fraudulent arrangement.40 Additionally, the investor must
have had no actual knowledge of the fraud and otherwise be allowed a theft
loss under IRC section 165 or under Regulations sections 1.165 to .168.41
Further, the fraudulent investment must not be a tax shelter.42
The safe harbor applies to Ponzi schemes only where the lead figure:
(1) receives cash or property from investors; (2) purports to earn income
for the investors; (3) reports at least partially fictitious income to investors;
and (4) misappropriates at least some of the investors’ cash or property.43
The safe harbor rules do not apply to: (1) unpaid loans of an investor from
fraudsters; (2) fees paid to the responsible parties that have been deducted
on the taxpayers’ tax returns; (3) fraudulent income not declared as income
on the taxpayers’ tax return; and (4) indirectly invested cash or property
paid to a fund or entity that in turn invested in the scheme.44
Under the safe harbor rules, the taxpayer may deduct either 95% of
the net investment loss if the taxpayer agrees to pursue no recovery from a
third party, or 75% of the net loss if the taxpayer intends to pursue recovery
from a third party.45 Third parties do not include: (1) individuals who
conducted the fraud; (2) investment vehicles or other entities that
conducted the fraud (including its employees, officers or directors); (3) a
liquidation, receivership, bankruptcy, or similar estate established with
respect to the individuals who committed the fraud; and (4) parties subject
to claims brought by a trustee, receivership, bankruptcy, or other estate
described in number 3 above.46 Actual recoveries from any party and
expected recoveries from insurance companies of the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation are netted against the fraud loss.47 Recoveries in
excess of the remaining 5% or 25% loss are income to the taxpayer in the
year of recovery under the tax benefit rule.48 The safe harbor does not
allow for the use of the theft loss deduction where there is not a Ponzi
scheme nor does it allow its use for victims of fraud where there is no
40. Id. § 4.02, at 750.
41. Id. § 4.03(1) and (2), at 750.
42. Id. § 4.03(3), at 750. The definition for tax shelters is found in section
6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) (2012).
43. Rev. Proc. 2009-20, 2009-14 I.R.B. 749, § 4.01, at 750.
44. Id. § 4.06(2), at 750.
45. Id. § 5.02(1), at 751.
46. Id. § 4.05, at 750.
47. Id. § 5.03, at 751; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d) (2015); Rev. Rul. 2009-9,
2009-14 I.R.B. 735, 736–37.
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d).
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criminal charge against the perpetrator.49 The focus of this Article is on
using the theft loss deduction in cases where this safe harbor does not
apply.
C. Evaluating Why There Would Be a Preference for Theft Loss
Treatment over Capital Loss Treatment
Corporations prefer ordinary losses over capital losses because capital
losses can only be offset by capital gains, with unused capital losses
generally being carried back three years and forward five years.50 For
individuals, capital losses either offset capital gains in the year a security is
sold or they become totally worthless.51 Where capital losses offset
long-term capital gains, the tax savings can be as high as 20% plus Net
Investment Income Tax at a rate of 3.8%.52 The first $3,000 of excess
capital losses over capital gains offset ordinary income,53 and the remainder
is carried forward to future years until used. A large loss net of capital
gains can take many years to recoup, and the application of the loss amount
does not consider the time value of money or inflation. Since a capital gain
is only experienced when there is a sale or gain on property, they “are less
likely to be recurring income. Thus, there is the potential that these losses
may never be utilized in the investor’s lifetime.”54
In addition, theft losses net of insurance reimbursement are deductible
at higher, ordinary income tax rates, and if the property is an investment,
they are deductible without regard to the 10% of AGI and the $100 per
incident floors for taxpayers who itemize deductions.55 If the theft loss
exceeds ordinary income for the year, a net operating loss may result56
which can be carried back and applied to income from previous years at
49. Claire H. Taylor, Helping Defrauded Investors Recoup Losses with the Tax Code:
Advice for Litigators, 21 PIABA B.J. 225, 225–26 (2014).
50. I.R.C. § 1212 (2012).
51. 26 C.F.R. 1.165-1. A mere decline in fair market value of securities held does not
qualify as a deductible capital loss, Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(f), unless the fair market value
makes a security worthless. I.R.C. § 165(g). One might be tempted to conclude that since
I.R.C. § 165(g) allows for individuals to have tax relief for securities becoming worthless,
that it is not necessary to apply I.R.C. § 165(c) to securities frauds perpetrated on all
individuals. However, courts have regularly applied the theft loss deduction in cases of
securities fraud in which the privity between the purchaser and seller of the security was not
broken. See Vietzke v. Comm’r, 37 T.C. 504 (1961).
52. I.R.C. § 1411 (2012).
53. I.R.C. § 1211 (2012).
54. Jeffrey P. Coleman & Jennifer Newsom, Can an Investment Become a Theft for Tax
Purposes?, 84 FLA. B.J. 27, 27 (2010).
55. I.R.C. § 165(h) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7 (2015).
56. I.R.C. § 172 (2012).
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ordinary tax rates.57 This makes theft loss treatment more advantageous
than capital loss treatment because more of the loss is recoverable for tax
purposes immediately, and the remainder is generally recoverable at a
faster rate under theft loss rules than under capital loss rules.58
The existence of investment fraud however is insufficient to result in
theft treatment. For example, in Stoltz v. United States,59 fraud was
confirmed when a taxpayer guaranteed a loan for a friend who
misrepresented his ability to repay the loan.60 While the friend’s
misrepresentation was fraudulent under state common law, the taxpayer
was required to deduct the loss as a non-business bad debt, which is treated
as a short-term capital loss.61 In another case, Kaplan v. United States,62 a
couple unknowingly invested in a Ponzi scheme and declared fictitious
income as represented on the false statements they received on their income
tax returns for eight years before discovering they were being defrauded.63
The couple was allowed a capital loss for their initial investment and
directed to amend the income on their tax returns where the statute of
limitations had not barred reducing the bogus income.64 However, they
were not allowed a casualty loss for the taxes paid on bogus income for
which the statute was otherwise barred.65
Chief Counsel Advice Memorandum 200811016 addresses a situation
where a loss should be split between capital and theft losses.66 Where a
company begins to engage in fraud after operating legitimately, taxpayers
who invested before the fraud was perpetrated receive capital loss
treatment, whereas those relying on fraudulent statements and investing
afterward would have a theft loss.67 Where a taxpayer invested both before

57. Brian Elzweig & Valrie Chambers, Modernizing the Theft Loss Deduction for
Victims of Securities Frauds and Ponzi Schemes, BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP., Sept.
2011, at 1, 7.
58. Id.
59. Stoltz v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 2d 734 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
60. Id. at 735.
61. Id. at 744; see also I.R.C. § 166 (2012).
62. Kaplan v. United States, 2008-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,117 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
63. Id. at 83,133–34.
64. Id. at 83,135.
65. Id.
66. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 200811016 (June 22, 2007). In this Chief Counsel
Advice Memorandum (CCA), the victims of the loss purchased investments directly from
the company perpetrating the fraud. Id. This CCA does not directly address a situation
where a taxpayer used an intermediary. Id.
67. Id.
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and after the fraud, the loss would be bifurcated, causing an arbitrage of
losses across differing tax rates.68
D. Analyzing Theft Loss Versus Return of Capital
Taxpayers have argued that previously declared income from Ponzi
schemes are not interest or dividend income as originally declared; instead
they are a return of capital. However, if the fraud is not found to be timely,
the statute of limitations may bar filing amended returns for previous years
that correctly omitted fictitious income thought to be earned under the
Ponzi scheme.69 And, courts are divided on whether a reclassification is
valid at all. In Premji v. Commissioner,70 a taxpayer loaned money to a
Ponzi scheme and received interest checks.71 The principal however was
not fully paid, and the taxpayer attempted to reclassify the interest income
that was declared as return of principal.72 In this case, the court denied the
reclassification request.73
However, there have been instances in which courts have granted
taxpayers’ requests for reclassification. In Taylor v. United States,74 a
taxpayer loaned money to a Ponzi scheme, receiving and declaring interest
checks, but the principal was not entirely repaid.75 Taylor was allowed to
reclassify the interest income as principal because the broker/promoter
never made any promises of return on investments.76 Similarly, in Kooyers
v. Commissioner,77 a taxpayer loaned money in a Ponzi scheme, receiving
interest checks, but lost principal in the scheme, then wanted to reclassify
interest income as return of capital.78 Here too, the reclassification was
allowed, but for a different reason. The court looked to the promoter’s
intent, which was not to make interest payments but was instead to conceal
fraud.79 Further, early investors who could have viably recovered their
68. John C. Zimmerman, Deducting Losses for Defrauded Investors, TAX ADVISER,
July 2009, at 442, 445 (discussing this arbitration).
69. See Johnson v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 360, 362–63 (2006).
70. Premji v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 16 (1996), aff’d, Premji v. Comm’r, 139 F.3d
912 (10th Cir. 1998).
71. Id. at 17.
72. Id. at 26.
73. Id.
74. Taylor v. United States, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,354, at 83,927 (E.D. Tenn.
1998).
75. Taylor, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,354 at 83,927.
76. Id. at 83,929–30.
77. Kooyers v. Comm’r, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 605 (2004).
78. Kooyers, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) at 606–09.
79. Id. at 614.
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investment were to be treated differently than later investors who had no
viable chance of recovery. Only the later victims could reclassify
previously declared income as return of capital.
This solution ignores the statute of limitations problem early investors
may have. For these early victims, the safe harbor rules of Revenue
Procedure 2009-20 are more appealing. In essence, since theft losses are
not subject to the same limitations as capital losses and allow the taxpayer
to deduct the full amount of the loss, in most cases they would be more
advantageous to a taxpayer than the capital loss.
II. THE TRADITIONAL ELEMENTS OF STATE LAW AND INTENT
A. What Is a Theft Under State Law?
In order to be a considered a theft for purposes of the theft loss
deduction, it has been generally held that “a taxpayer must establish that a
‘theft’ occurred by showing that the taking is illegal under the law of the
state in which it occurred . . . and that it was done with criminal intent.”80
The notion that the theft has to be a violation of law of the state where it
occurred is usually traced back to the often-cited Edwards v. Bromberg
case, which was decided in 1956.81 In Edwards, the taxpayer was
defrauded into giving a third party over $50,000 to bet on a horse race.82
The race was supposedly rigged so that the taxpayer’s money was not at
risk.83 The third party, however, embezzled the money instead of betting
it.84 The government argued that the taxpayer was swindled, but the
swindle did not meet the definition of a statutory theft in Georgia where the
swindle occurred.85 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument stating that
“theft” is not a term of art, “but is, on the contrary, a word of general and
broad connotation, intended to cover and covering any criminal
appropriation of another’s property to the use of the taker, particularly
including theft by swindling, false pretenses, and any other form of
guile.”86 In determining this, the court used precedent showing that other
previous interpretations of the theft loss did not require that the loss occur
because of a violation of a criminal statute, but instead noted:

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Taylor, supra note 49, at 229.
Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956).
Id. at 109 n.3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 110.
Id. (emphasis added).
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[u]nder this line of decisions it has been long and well established
that whether a loss from theft occurs within the purview of [the theft
loss deduction statute] and the corresponding provisions of prior
acts, depends upon the law of the jurisdiction where it was sustained
and that the exact nature of the crime, whether larceny or
embezzlement, of obtaining money under false pretenses, swindling
or other wrongful deprivations of the property of another, is of little
importance so long as it amounts to theft.87
Thus, Edwards has become the seminal case in determining that for a theft
to be deductable as a loss, the theft must meet the definition of theft within
the jurisdiction in which it occurred.
This determination was questioned recently in Goeller v. United
States.88 In Goeller, the taxpayers, who were located in California, had
invested in an Ohio company that was buying and selling real estate.89
There was a dispute over whether the company had filed certain mortgages
and why the properties were no longer listed on the company’s financial
statements.90 The taxpayers, with the help of Tobias Elsass and the Fraud
Recovery Group (who also represented the company) filed amended tax
returns claiming that the losses were due to theft and a refund should be
given.91 The court noted that “[b]oth parties cite authority for the
proposition that whether a ‘theft’ has occurred, for purposes of section
165(c)(3) of the Code, depends upon whether a theft has occurred under
state law.”92 However, the parties disputed which state’s law should apply:
Ohio, where the company was located, or California, where the taxpayers
resided.93
The court noted that this required a determination similar to that of a
conflict of laws to decide whether Ohio or California law would be
determinative.94 Instead, the judge thought the federal common law of
theft could be used as well as appropriate state law.95 The court examined
the history of the associated rulings with previous rulings relying on state
law to determine whether a theft occurred.96 It was noted that the court in
Edwards made the statement that whether or not there is a theft depends on
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 111 (emphasis added).
Goeller v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 534 (2013).
Id. at 536.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 537–38.
Id. at 539.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 543.
Id.
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the law of the jurisdiction where it was sustained.97 The court noted that
many cases then get into lengthy discussions about whether or not a theft
meets the definition of theft within a particular jurisdiction.98 Further, the
court stated that “[n]either Edwards nor any of its progeny, however,
explain why state law should control the definition of what is a ‘theft’—
most opinions are satisfied to treat the sentence from Edwards quoted
above as axiomatic.”99 The judge opined that it is paradoxical to think that
Congress would intend a state law reading for theft losses when other
triggering events under section 165 of the IRC (including fire, storm,
shipwreck and casualty) are given their plain meanings in determining
whether there is a deductible loss.100 The court noted that a fundamental
principle that controls the construction of federal statutes is that the “plain
meaning . . . should be conclusive,”101 and there is no reason to apply theft
losses differently. The court noted:
The key word in the statute—“theft”—has a long-standing and
well-accepted meaning. Familiar lexicons mark this path. Thus,
[Black’s Law Dictionary] defines that term as “[t]he fraudulent
taking of corporeal personal property belonging to another, from his
possession, or from the possession of some person holding the same
for him, without his consent, with intent to deprive the owner of the
value of the same, and to appropriate it to the use or benefit of the
person taking.” At least by the time the 1954 Code was enacted, it
also was well-accepted that the definition of “theft” includes a crime
in which one “obtains possession of property by lawful means and
thereafter appropriates the property to the taker’s own use.”102
The court stated that since nothing in the legislative history of IRC section
165 suggested otherwise, the longstanding rules of statutory interpretation
require that the plain meaning must be used.103 By using the words “or
from the possession of some person holding the same for him,” Black’s
Law Dictionary implies the use of an intermediary would not negate a theft
loss.104
97. Id. at 540.
98. Id.; see also Alioto v. Comm’r, 699 F.3d 948, 955 (6th Cir. 2012); Estate of
Meriano v. Comm’r, 142 F.3d 651, 658 (3d Cir. 1998); Bellis v. Comm’r, 540 F.2d 448, 449
(9th Cir. 1976); Stoltz v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 2d 734, 740–41 (S.D. Ind. 2006). The
court noted that these were just a sampling of many cases that cite Edwards for this
authority.
99. Goeller, 109 Fed. Cl. at 540.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 542 (citations omitted).
103. Id.
104. Theft, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
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In examining the legislative intent, the court questioned why Congress
would have intended the word theft to include “content independent from
state law,”105 but limit its use to the laws of the jurisdiction in which the
theft occurred.106 The court asserted that this would require federal trial
courts to preside over mini-trials to determine if the precise and sometimes
complicated elements of state criminal laws (oftentimes involving mens rea
requirements) are violated to resolve the deductibility of a theft loss under
federal law.107 It questioned why Congress would not use the “plethora of
Federal statutes that criminalize ‘thefts’ [including] various forms of
larceny, embezzlement, fraud, and robbery; as well as money laundering,
wire fraud, and other conduct associated with such crimes.”108 The court
noted that there were instances in which the courts have stated that a
federal statute may be the basis for a plaintiff to take the theft loss
deduction, but the plaintiff still has to “gauge the deductibility of his losses
by hypothetically applying a state criminal law,”109 rather than rely on the
influence of federal statutes to outweigh specific state laws. The court
noted the concerns of commentators that “the victims of securities fraud
crimes prosecuted under Federal law might not qualify for deductions
under section 165(c)(3) because their losses would not be viewed as
resulting from thefts under state law.”110 Arguably, allowing a federal
definition of theft would allow for the common application of the federal
statute nationwide, simplifying multi-state cases such as Goeller, and
streamlining federal tax results among taxpayers from different states.
After examining the legislative history and likely intent of Congress,
the court stated that the Edwards reasoning has become a “shibboleth”111
and that it has only become embedded in the jurisprudence of IRC section
165 because of its constant repetition. Since there is no basis in the history
105. Goeller, 109 Fed. Cl. at 545.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.; see also Brown Corp. of Ionia v. Comm’r, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 200, 213 (1982);
Nichols v. Comm’r, 43 T.C. 842, 884–85 (1965).
110. Goeller, 109 Fed. Cl. at 545 n.29; see also Elzweig & Chambers, supra note 57, at
7.
111. Goeller, 109 Fed. Cl. at 540. A shibboleth is defined as “an old idea, opinion, or
saying that is commonly believed and repeated but that may be seen as old-fashioned or
untrue.” Shibboleth, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
shibboleth [https://perma.cc/TA8M-U343]. It comes from a story in the Hebrew Bible in
which Gilead determined whether or not an Ephramite could cross the Jordan River. The
language of the Ephramites had no “sh” sound so Gilead would tell them to say the word
“shibboleth.” If a person pronounced it as Sibboleth, Gilead would know it was an
Ephramite and would have the person slaughtered. Judges 12:6.
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of the statute, and no legislative intent otherwise, the court maintained that
the plain meaning should be used. This would include thefts as defined
under federal common law.
B. What Is Intent?
It is important to note that in Goeller, at least in dicta, the court
addressed the issue that securities fraud can rarely be the basis for the theft
loss deduction. The analysis in Goeller is consistent with the definition of
fraud for securities law as being equivalent to theft by false pretenses. One
commentator noted: “Section 10(b), [which is the] heart of securities fraud
[requires the fraudster]: ‘[t]o use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance.’”112 This provision is further addressed in SEC Regulation
Rule 10b-5.113 This rule specifies that in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security, it is unlawful to:
‘employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,’ to ‘make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,’ or to
‘engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.’114
However, aside from requiring a state law definition of theft,
securities fraud cannot usually be the basis for a theft loss deduction
because the element of intent is often missing.115 Another often-cited
requirement for use of the theft loss deduction is that there has to be intent
to deprive the rightful owner of the property.116 The use of an intermediary
appears to disqualify the taxpayer from claiming the theft loss except where
the intermediary is acting as a feeder.117 Because intent to permanently
deprive another of property is required to prove the theft in most
jurisdictions, the IRS has argued that there needs to be direct privity

112. Christine Hurt, Regulation Through Criminalization: Of Breaches of the Peace,
Home Invasions, and Securities Fraud, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1365, 1371 (2007) (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006)).
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007)).
115. Valrie Chambers, Brian Elzweig, & Judson Stryker, Unequal Tax Effects for
Equivalent Stock Losses, 148 TAX NOTES 447, 451 (2015).
116. See, e.g., Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1956); Rev. Rul.
2009-9, 2009-14 I.R.B. 735.
117. See Paine v. Comm’r, 63 T.C. 736, 737, 742 (1975); see also Jensen v. Comm’r, 66
T.C.M. (CCH) 543, 547 (1993).
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between the one perpetrating the fraud and the one who is defrauded.118
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “privity” as “mutual or successive
relationships
to
the
same
right
of
property . . . .”119
120
In Taghadoss v. Commissioner, the taxpayer purchased stock and
exercised options through WorldCom’s 401(k) and employee stock
purchase plan.121 WorldCom officials were convicted of releasing
fraudulent financial statements, resulting in WorldCom filing for
bankruptcy.122 The taxpayer argued that, while the company’s pension and
stock purchase plans were legally independent entities from the company
itself, the false financial statements from the WorldCom Corporation were
a fraud against him as an investor.123 However, Taghadoss did not produce
evidence that he relied upon WorldCom executives’ assurances and no
theft loss was allowed.124 The IRS argued that while WorldCom executives
committed fraud, under Virginia law the taxpayer was denied a theft loss
on this stock because he technically did not purchase the stock directly
from the corporation.125 The IRS contended that there was no evidence
WorldCom wrongfully and intentionally took the petitioner’s property with
the objective to deprive him permanently thereof.126 Further, the IRS
argued that the petitioner had bought his securities not from WorldCom but
through brokers.127
In making its decision, the court relied on Paine v. Commissioner.128
There, the court ruled that the “[p]etitioner did not purchase his stock from
the persons who made the misrepresentations, but on the open market.
There is no evidence that the previous owners of the stock participated in or
were even aware of the misrepresentations of [the issuing company’s]
officers.”129 The court contrasted this position with that of Vietzke v.
Commissioner,130 where the taxpayer purchased stock in a new corporation
directly from the directors of the corporation.131 The principals in the
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See, e.g., Goeller v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 534, 549–50 (2013).
Privity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
Taghadoss, v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2008-44 (2008).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8–10.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Paine v. Comm’r, 63 T.C. 736 (1975).
Id. at 742.
Vietzke v. Comm’r, 37 T.C. 504 (1961).
Id. at 505–06.
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company withdrew large portions of the money and the Indiana state
insurance commission halted further sale of the securities.132 The company
was then put into receivership.133 Although the court held that it “need not
determine the exact nature of the crime under Indiana law,”134 the court
determined that the taxpayer had been defrauded of his money by a
deception meeting the standard of a criminal appropriation with felonious
intent, and thus meeting the meaning of “theft” under both Indiana law and
section 165.135 However, privity was not at issue here because the taxpayer
dealt directly with the corporate officers who intended to defraud him.
Similarly, in First Chicago Corp. v. Commissioner,136 a taxpayer was
allowed a theft loss deduction where the taxpayer made an investment in a
foreign company from the company itself.137
In Jensen v. Commissioner,138 where the taxpayer was defrauded in a
Ponzi scheme, the taxpayer purchased stock from a person unknowingly
acting as a conduit for the fraudulent scheme.139 There, the court hinted
that privity could be indirect, stating:
There is no requirement that an investor have direct contact with the
entity in which he is investing. It is not uncommon for investors to
deal only with their brokers and never have direct contact with their
investments. In such cases, the brokers act as conduits for the
investors’ funds. The record in the case before us indicates that [the
conduit’s] role in the Chacklan investment was that of a broker; he
clearly was acting as a conduit for his clients’ funds.140
The key distinction in Jensen was not whether a broker was used, but what
role the broker played in the investment. In this case, whether or not the
broker knew of the fraud, the broker was ruled to be acting as a feeder for
the corporation, rather than as a traditional broker working for the
taxpayer.141 Some entities have been found to be conduits “only if they
have no control over the disposition of the assets and no potential benefit to
be gained from the assets by holding them.”142
132. Id. at 507–08.
133. Id. at 508.
134. Id. at 511.
135. Id.
136. First Chi. Corp. v, Comm’r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2089 (1995).
137. Id. at 2103.
138. Jensen v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 543 (1993).
139. Id. at 544–46.
140. Id. at 546.
141. Zimmerman, supra note 68, at 444.
142. I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. CC:NA:MAN:TL-N-5745-95, 8 (Aug. 30, 1995)
(citations omitted). In some circumstances the feeder may also be the victim of the fraud,
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The 1960 case of Boothe v. Commissioner143 went even further. In
that case, Boothe owned a parcel of land that he had purchased with
Soldier’s Additional Homestead Rights, which allowed the holder to
receive fee simple interest in some federal lands.144 Boothe sold the rights
to another party named Spoo, who was unable to exercise the rights due to
an 1898 assignment of the rights known to neither Boothe nor Spoo.145
Spoo sued Boothe, obtaining a judgment for breach of warranty of title;
Boothe tried to claim the amount of the judgment as a theft loss.146 The
Tax Court held that the loss was a capital loss, not a theft loss because the
origin of the claim was the sale of the property to Spoo.147 Having held
that the origin-of-the-claim argument was critical, the Tax Court then said
in its majority opinion that “it is unnecessary for us to decide whether a
taxpayer who is not the direct victim of a theft is entitled to deduct a theft
loss.”148 There were two dissenting opinions filed.149
However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the first
dissenting opinion (the Körner dissent), where the loss was split into two
parts: the original purchase was to be considered a theft loss to Boothe
because he purchased nonexistent rights in the land; and the loss on the
subsequent sale of the property to Spoo was to be considered a capital
loss.150 Judge Körner noted that the “petitioner was the victim of a loss
arising from theft, even though he was not the immediate purchaser from
the fraudulent vendor” and that his loss entitled him to a theft loss
deduction.151
In the second dissent (the Hamblen dissent), Judge Hamblen argued
that the statute on its face required no privity, stating:
The language of section 165(c)(3) itself requires that “losses
arise * * * from theft.” In the absence of any compelling reason to
especially where the intermediary is a fund or entity in its own right. In Willey v.
Commissioner, a taxpayer loaned money to three corporations who in turn invested in that
money in fraudulent trust funds. Willey v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1757, 1757 (1998).
The corporations were allowed the theft loss; the taxpayer was denied a theft loss, but not a
capital loss. Id. at 1758.
143. Boothe v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 804 (1984), rev’d per curiam, 768 F.2d 1140 (9th Cir.
1985).
144. Id. at 805.
145. Id. at 806.
146. Id. at 807.
147. Id. at 809.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 809 (Körner, J., dissenting); id. at 812 (Hamblen, J., dissenting).
150. Boothe v. Comm’r, 768 F.2d 1140,1140–41 (9th Cir. 1985). The case was then
remanded for disposition consistent with that dissenting opinion. Id.
151. Boothe, 82 T.C. at 810 (Körner, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law,

19

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1

20

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

disregard the plain language of the statute or its logical result, the
legislative mandate of Congress must be taken at its word. . . .
It is true, of course, that in the overwhelming majority of cases,
a taxpayer who suffers a theft loss will simultaneously be the victim
of the theft from which the loss arises. In unusual circumstances,
however, such as those which confront petitioner in this instance,
dual victimization will not result. Where this is so, it must be borne
in mind that the target of section 165 is treatment of losses, not
treatment of thefts.
The intended direct connection between the taxpayer and the
loss is clearly expressed in the requirements of section 165(a).
Section 165(c)(3) modifies section 165(a) only by requiring that
there be a causal connection between the loss and the theft. There is,
however, no legislative expression of any similar connection
between the taxpayer and the theft, and we find no reason to infer
such requirement. Therefore, petitioner need only prove that he has
suffered a loss and that said loss arose from theft. Having carried
this burden of proof, he need not demonstrate any direct relationship
between himself and the act of theft.152
That is, by adopting the view of the Körner dissent in a 10-8 decision,
the Ninth Circuit has taken the very controversial approach that privity is
not needed to claim a theft loss deduction.153 With both the judicial
controversy and the unusual facts of the case, most other courts have
responded by marginalizing the holding of this case. One commentator
observed that “Boothe [is] very citable, but the sharp differences in opinion
noted by the Ninth Circuit persist.”154 Two months later, the United States
Court of Federal Claims relied on Boothe in Krahmer v. United States,155
deciding that direct privity between the one perpetrating the fraud and the
victim of the fraud was unnecessary.156 Citing Boothe, the claims court in
Krahmer stated that “[t]o deny plaintiff a deduction because [the seller]
himself did not possess criminal intent would be to draw a distinction
between victims that is not commanded by the statute and that is both
unwarranted and inequitable.”157

152. Id. at 816–17 (Hamblen, J., dissenting).
153. Boothe, 768 F.2d at 1140.
154. Anne-Marie Rhodes, On Art Theft, Tax, and Time: Triangulating Ownership
Disputes Through the Tax Code, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 516 (2006).
155. Krahmer v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 49 (1985), rev’d, 810 F.2d 1145 (Fed Cir.
1987).
156. Id. at 52.
157. Id. at 53.
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The Eleventh Circuit overturned the claims court’s decision without
discussing the Boothe decision on which the initial decision was based.158
Additionally, the court in Jensen referred to the Boothe decision when it
asserted “there is no requirement that an investor have direct contact with
the entity in which he is investing.”159 However, the Jensen decision did
not rely on the principle that no direct contact was required, because Jensen
had contact through the seller’s conduit.160
In the 2008 case of Electric Picture Solutions v. Commissioner,161
involving a California-based taxpayer, the decision generally followed the
Ninth Circuit opinion in Boothe.162 In this case, the taxpayer purchased
shares of stock in Novatek International Inc. (Novatek) through a
stockbroker.163 Under allegations of fraud, Novatek filed for bankruptcy
leaving the taxpayer no market in which to sell his shares.164 The taxpayer
alleged that the stockbroker also acted fraudulently by “making claims
about the company in order to sell its stock,” and by “breach[ing] the
stockbroker’s duty of truth and fitness for his customer’s portfolio.”165 The
court held that there was inadequate evidence that the stockbroker had the
intent to deceive the taxpayer, and ruled against the taxpayer because of
lack of privity between Novatek and the taxpayer, contradicting the Boothe
decision.166 The court mentioned Boothe only in a footnote, narrowly
interpreting the Boothe holding:
In certain narrow circumstances a theft loss deduction has been
allowed where the taxpayer suffered a loss which arose indirectly
from a theft between other parties. See Boothe v. Commissioner,
768 F.2d 1140 (9th Cir. 1985) (allowing a theft loss deduction with
respect to the taxpayer’s purchase of nonexistent rights to land, even
though the taxpayer was not the immediate purchaser from the
fraudulent vendor), revg. 82 T.C. 804 (1984). Petitioner has not
alleged or established that it suffered a loss which arose from a theft
between other parties.167
158. Krahmer v. United States, 810 F.2d 1145, 1147 (Fed Cir. 1987); see also Rhodes,
supra note 154, at 518.
159. Jensen v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 543, 546 (1993).
160. Id.
161. Elec. Picture Solutions, Inc. v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 146 (2008).
162. Id. at 148.
163. Id. at 146.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 147.
166. Id. at 14748.
167. Id. at 147 n.6. This ruling is consistent with Revenue Ruling 77-17, where a theft
loss deduction was denied to a taxpayer who purchased a publicly traded corporate stock
from a stockbroker, even though corporate irregularities led to a suspension of stock trading.
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The concept of direct privity arises out of state laws which require the
specific intent to defraud the specific victim, as opposed to the specific
intent to defraud any victim from whom a perpetrator can deceive and
profit. The interpretation of intent results in various case law decisions.
When dealing with an intermediary, it is possible the intermediary
intends to defraud the purchaser, in which case, all other tests for theft loss
being met, the purchaser can deduct a theft loss for the fraud. Where the
intermediary does not intend to defraud the purchaser, a theft loss is
allowed where the relationship of the intermediary is that of a feeder to the
perpetrator to the fraud. Arguably, if the intermediary was merely an agent
or performing ministerial tasks for the buyer, a theft loss should be allowed
for the theft loss under agency theory also.168 However, where the
intermediary is independent of both the purchaser and the seller, the results
are somewhat muddled.
C. What Are the Exceptions to Privity?
For a loss to be a theft loss, a party must purposefully intend to
permanently deprive another of their property, or commit intentional
misconduct or severe recklessness.169 For example, in Krahmer,170 the
plaintiff purchased two paintings from an art dealer that were subsequently
determined to be falsely attributed to famous artists. The plaintiff claimed
a theft loss deduction under IRC section 165(c).171 The claims court
focused on whether there was intent to defraud on the part of the art dealer.
One painting had a counterfeit signature attributable to famous artist W.M.
Chase. The other was unsigned but was accompanied by the art dealer’s
affidavit stating that the art dealer “had examined the painting, that it was

Rev. Rul. 77-17, 1977-1 C.B. 44, 46. The rationale in Revenue Ruling 77-17 was that the
perpetrators of the corporate fraud did not specifically intend to defraud that specific
taxpayer, nor did the company obtain possession to the taxpayer’s property as was required
under the definition of state law with jurisdiction. Id. at 45. In the alternative, it was not
proven that the broker was fraudulent. Id.
168. The seller of investments often considers the broker to be the buyer’s agent. For
example, in Allianz’s Privacy and Security Statement, they say, “we may collect your
information from the following sources: From you, either directly or through your agent,”
where the agent includes the stockbroker facilitating the purchase of the investment.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, ALLIANZ LIFE INS. CO. OF N.Y., PRIVACY AND SECURITY
STATEMENT 1 (2012) (emphasis added), https://laserapp.orcasnet.com/pdfs/%7B22050829499C-4537-B761-9EB76938613C%7D.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7PH-KNUY].
169. See Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp. Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 343–44 (4th Cir. 2003).
170. Krahmer v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 49, 51 (1985), rev’d, 810 F.2d 1145 (Fed Cir.
1987).
171. Id. at 49.
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by Nicolas Poussin, and that its appraised value was $75,000.”172 Neither
painting was created by the attributed artist, and consequently, the plaintiff
sold both paintings below his basis.
The court disallowed the theft loss deduction for the unsigned painting
because the dealer had not “schemed to defraud [the plaintiff] on the
purchase” of the unsigned painting.173 The dealer could “honestly err in his
judgment as to the attribution of an unsigned work . . . [and the dealer’s]
written statement to plaintiff . . . makes it clear that [he] was only rendering
an opinion.”174 The claims court allowed the theft deduction for the signed
painting stating that the “plaintiff has suffered a loss at the hands of a
forger, however distant in time or privity was the forger’s act. Plaintiff
need not know the identity of the forger. He need only prove that forgery
was the cause of [his] loss.”175 However, the allowance of the theft loss
deduction was overturned on appeal.176 The Federal Circuit stated that
“[t]he court cannot presume that a theft occurred based solely on the
presence of a forged signature on the painting. [The] [t]axpayer still must
prove that the seller defrauded him by knowingly and intentionally
misattributing the painting to the artist.”177 That is, the Federal Circuit
essentially required direct privity between the perpetrator of the fraud and
the taxpayer who claims the theft loss deduction, and that view is held by
most states. By extension, the result is that taxpayers relying equally on
fraudulent financial statements who incur equal losses may be treated
unequally under the tax code if one purchased the investment directly from
the company perpetrating the fraud and the other purchased an equal
investment from a broker; in the first case the fraud loss would be treated
as a theft loss, while in the second case the loss would be treated as a
capital loss because the second investor lacked direct privity with the fraud
perpetrator.
D. What Are the Consequences?
In situations where one buys securities not directly from the seller, and
not from an intermediary who is either party to the fraud, or a feeder or a
conduit, the theft loss deduction for securities fraud has not been

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 51.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 53.
Krahmer v. United States, 810 F.2d 1145, 1148 (Fed Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1147.
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allowed.178 A question that was left unanswered in Goeller is whether a
brokered transaction, where direct privity was broken, could still be the
basis for one to claim a theft loss deduction. By mentioning that “[s]everal
commentators have expressed concern that the victims of securities fraud
crimes prosecuted under Federal law might not qualify for deductions
under section 165(c)(3) because their losses would not be viewed as
resulting from thefts under state law,”179 perhaps the judge was alluding to
allowance for broader inclusion of securities frauds for theft loss
deductions. This was not an issue in the case itself because the plaintiff
bought securities directly from the company which committed the fraud.
The judge in Goeller proffered that the well-cited ruling in Edwards
was a shibboleth since there was nothing in the legislative history that
would require that a plaintiff to show that there was a taking of property
that was a under the state law of the jurisdiction in which the taking
occurred in order to claim a theft loss deduction.180 Instead this was
created by the Edwards case and its progeny through repetition of
citation.181
Perhaps the same could be said of the direct privity rule between the
plaintiff and the person committing the fraud. Analyses of the privity rule
have been done previously, but in light of Goeller, it should be
reexamined.182 Nothing in the legislative history of the theft loss deduction
statutes mention this requirement.183 Instead, the progeny of this seems to
arise from the Edwards case as well. That is, privity is sometimes out of
step with the plain meaning of theft (which merely includes the intent to
deceive); and, nothing in the statute or legislative history necessitates that
the thief and the plaintiff have direct privity.184
A logical explanation of section 165 would require that a loss occur by
theft. It does not require that the taxpayer necessarily be in direct privity
with the thief. Indeed there are many ways in which one would be a victim
of a theft without having direct privity with the thief. Logically, if one
178. See, e.g., Taghadoss v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2008-44, at 10 (2008); Paine v.
Comm’r, 63 T.C. 736, 737, 742 (1975).
179. Goeller v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 534, 545 n.29 (2013).
180. Id. at 540.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Elzweig & Chambers, supra note 57.
183. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, at II-342 (1986) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 99-313
(1986); H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 658 (1985); H.R. REP. NO. 83-2543 (1954) (Conf. Rep.); S.
REP. NO. 83-1622, at 23, 198 (1954); H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 21, A46 (1954); H.R. REP.
NO. 64-1200 (1916) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 64-793 (1916); H.R. REP. NO. 64-922 (1916).
184. See I.R.C. § 165 (2015); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 104, for a
similar definition of theft.
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buys stock through a broker and there is a fraud that renders the stock
worthless, that person is no less a victim of the theft than one who bought
stock directly from a company. Yet that appears to be the current
interpretation of the law. In Vietzke v. Commissioner,185 the taxpayer was
allowed to take a theft loss deduction because he had bought the stock
directly from the company.186 It seems anomalous to say that the taxpayer
in Vietzke was victimized any more than another investor who may have
bought the same securities through a broker.
The question of victimization was also addressed by a dissenting
opinion in Boothe.187 The first dissent, which was adopted on appeal,
allowed for the taxpayer to take the theft loss for purchasing nonexistent
rights in land even though he was not the immediate purchaser from a
fraudulent vendor.188 The inequity between the victims who purchased
from brokers and those who purchased from a fraudulent vendor was
discussed, and it was argued that the plain interpretation of the statutory
language could easily be read as one that protects all victims of thefts. The
Ninth Circuit adopted this opinion, but noted that this was based on unusual
facts that created sharp differences within the Tax Court. Because there is
no reason not to think of someone using a broker as a victim, this would
give those taxpayers equal access to the theft loss deduction regardless of
privity. Perhaps this dissenting opinion should be more widely considered
and adopted.
It is established that securities fraud may be considered a theft for the
theft loss deduction, but not in cases where the securities were bought on
an open market. These transactions have consistently been held to lack
intent and privity.189 The question that needs to be answered is: why is
privity required, or rather, why is victimhood not enough? Case law has
not explored this issue, but it was examined in commentary.190 Three
reasons are put forth as to why the IRS is concerned with direct privity to
use the theft loss deduction: it is an “unexamined historical imperative, the
traditional section 165(c)(3) suddenness requirement,...and [problems
with] distinguishing theft from mistake.”191 These three rationalizations
need to be discussed in light of Goeller.

185. Vietzke v. Comm’r, 37 T.C. 504, 510 (1961).
186. Id. at 511.
187. Boothe v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 804, 809–10 (1984).
188. Id. at 817.
189. Taylor, supra note 49, at 230.
190. For a general examination of the privity requirement under I.R.C. § 165, see
generally Rhodes, supra note 154.
191. Rhodes, supra note 154, at 518.
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The historical imperative rationale seems to arise from the Edwards
case, which relied “upon the law of the jurisdiction where [the theft] was
sustained.”192 After Edwards, its progeny often cited this clause, based on
shibboleth193 without much examination as to whether its application made
sense. This has been used by many subsequent cases to substantiate that
there must be privity for this intent to be formed. There is nothing in the
legislative history to show that this was the intent of the statute. Perhaps
this too is a shibboleth. It is perfectly logical to interpret the statute to state
there must be intent to commit the theft, but there only needs to be a
connection between the loss and the theft as was stated in the dissent in
Boothe.194 This would require only that an intentional theft take place, but
would allow the use of the theft loss deduction regardless of privity. Since
this taxpayer would still be a victim of the theft, it would seem fair to allow
federal income tax theft loss treatment.
The second argument for why there is a privity requirement is that
other casualties listed in section 165(c)(3) have a suddenness to them. It is
proffered that the term “or of theft” may be interpreted using “ejusdem
generis, that is, [to] interpret the phrase in the light of the surrounding
terms.”195 This is the case for how courts have interpreted the phrase
“other casualty” in section 165(c)(3).196 Using ejusdem generis, courts
have interpreted “other casualty” to only include sudden unexpected or
cataclysmic events.197 If the tincture of time underlies deductibility for
“fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty,” it may, consciously or not, also
color the interpretation of “or from theft.”198 This argument, however,
seems to be in contradiction with embezzlements, which can happen over
an extended period of time,199 as well as with the logic used in Goeller.
The judge in Goeller, when describing why he felt that federal law should
192. Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 1956).
193. Goeller v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 534, 540 (2013).
194. Boothe v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 804, 816 (1984) (Hamblen, J., dissenting), rev’d, 768
F.2d 1140 (9th Cir. 1985).
195. See Rhodes, supra note 154, at 519.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See generally United States v. Ciccolini, 750 F. Supp. 2d 850 (N.D. Ohio 2010),
vacated, 491 F. App’x 529 (6th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Ohle, 678 F. Supp. 2d
215, 223 & n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (stating defendant’s embezzlement spanned at least 2000–
2003). In Ciccolini, an ordained Catholic priest founded the Interval Brotherhood House, a
drug rehabilitation center, and subsequently embezzled approximately $5 million from the
center. Ciccolini, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 852. While the exact amounts and time periods of
embezzlement are unknown, the crime extended from at least 2000–2007, and possibly
decades before discovery. Id. at 853.
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apply as well as state law, noted that court cases relying on the state
definition of theft have not explained why state law is superior to federal
law, continuing:
As such, none of them begin to explain why Congress would want
state-by-state variability in the treatment of theft losses for Federal
income tax purposes, particularly via a provision in which all the
other triggering events for deductible losses—fire, storm, shipwreck,
or casualty—are defined not by state law, but by reference to their
plain meanings.200
If one were to understand the plain meaning of the statute to involve a
theft, and only require a causal connection between the theft and the loss,
there would be no reason to use maxims of interpretation such as ejusdem
generis. The plain meaning would apply over such maxims. Theft is a
broad term. There are some thefts which occur quickly, but some may
evolve over time due to complicated schemes. If a theft took longer to
commit, such as long-term embezzlement, it is no less a theft than if a
person is robbed at gunpoint.
In addition, this would aid in resolving one of the main issues raised in
Goeller. The judge opined that it was problematic to use state law because
state-by-state variability existed in the interpretation of the term “theft”
which made the application of the statute inconsistent.201 The judge’s
rationale behind this was that states differ on definitions of the word “theft”
and “often deal[] with complicated questions involving the elements or
mens rea requirements of particular state crime.”202 Even if the courts were
to allow federal common law to determine whether or not there is a theft,
presumably it would be in addition to still allowing for state law to apply as
well. Eliminating the privity requirement would ease the courts’ burden of
determining if there is intent under state laws, increasing the likelihood that
a victim of the theft would have relief. This judicial burden, left unabated
by a refusal to allow a federal interpretation of theft, could continue to
multiply as investors from all states use online brokerage houses and
multistate (or multinational) brokerages to conduct trades.
The third argument that has been put forth, that problems have arisen
surrounding the determination between theft and mistake, can also be
debunked using the logic in Goeller. The fear is that by eliminating a
requirement that there be “a nexus between thief and taxpayer[,] . . . [it]
could ultimately blur the tax distinctions between generally deductible
business losses and generally nondeductible personal losses so that all
200. Goeller v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 534, 540 (2013).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 545.
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losses become deductible.”203 The Goeller holding allows for federal
common law to be the basis for taking a theft loss deduction. When talking
about federal crimes of larceny, embezzlement, fraud, robbery, money
laundering, and wire fraud, the Goeller decision asked, “[c]an it be that
when a conviction for theft is obtained under one of these Federal statutes,
a taxpayer harmed by that conduct must still gauge the deductibility of his
losses by hypothetically applying a state criminal law?”204 It seems that, at
least in cases where there was a conviction of a federal theft crime, the
judge in Goeller would allow for the theft loss deduction to be taken.
The question remains: would securities fraud, which victimizes a
person as much as any of the crimes contemplated in Goeller, be a basis for
the deduction? The fear is that the taxpayers would claim the theft
deduction in transactions unrelated to theft. Thus, the tax system would
then “become an insurer of sorts not only for theft but mistakes in judgment
as well, something Congress did not intend.”205
There is certainly the potential for abuse as with any other tax
deduction. But by claiming the theft loss deduction, “the taxpayer bears
the burden of proof to establish that he or she is entitled to the
deduction.”206 In fact, the IRS has collected evidence that many people
improperly claim investment losses as theft losses.207 However, the fact
that many more people would use a deduction that is in line with
Congressional intent is not a reason to limit the deduction. That would be
in the purview of Congress. Congress could limit the use of the deduction
for securities fraud only to those cases where there was a conviction or an
indictment if it so wished to limit the deduction. Until then it is incumbent
on the IRS to enforce the law as it is written.
Recently the IRS has made an effort to scrutinize the use of securities
losses as the basis of a theft loss. The Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration has recommended that the IRS increase ways to target
investment losses as that are being claimed to be theft losses.208 Tax
practitioners are also being warned that the IRS may be scrutinizing closely
taxpayer claims of theft loss for investment losses.209 This, however, may
lead to more cases in which the courts will interpret section 165(c)(3),

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Rhodes, supra note 154, at 520.
Goeller, 109 Fed. Cl. at 545.
Rhodes, supra note 154, at 520.
Taylor, supra note 49, at 236.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 243.
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which could ultimately soften or eliminate the privity requirement in light
of Goeller.
The shibboleth argument also has merit because prior to the twentieth
century, the evolution of fraud and theft was very slow, if at all existent.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, national organized stock markets
emerged, providing both financial opportunities and additional
opportunities to defraud investors. The number of companies choosing to
be a separate legal entity (corporation) increased dramatically, and more
professional managers were hired for salary and sometimes a performance
bonus, generally based on corporate net income. Brokers, as a group, sold
both valuable and specious investments to investors who were largely
removed from the day-to-day operations of the company in which they
invested. Some of the early problems with stock market abuses were cured
by the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934.210
Over time, management compensation rose until Congress, incensed
at the amount officers of public corporations were paid, limited the amount
of officer compensation that a corporation could deduct to $1,000,000 (not
indexed to inflation), except to the extent that the excess compensation
could be tied to corporate performance.211 To get around these rules,
corporations began shifting the way they compensated managers from cash
salary plus bonus (both of which were taxable to the corporate officer
immediately at ordinary income tax rates) to a base cash salary plus
corporate stock options.212 Corporations had found that by paying officers

210. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77a (2012)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012)).
211. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2012).
212. I.R.C. § 422(b) (2012). This statute defines an incentive stock option as:
[A]n option granted to an individual for any reason connected with his
employment by the employer corporation, if granted by the employer corporation
or its parent or subsidiary corporation, to purchase stock of any of such
corporations, but only if—
(1) the option is granted pursuant to a plan which includes the aggregate
number of shares which may be issued under options and the employees (or
class of employees) eligible to receive options, and which is approved by the
stockholders of the granting corporation within 12 months before or after the
date such plan is adopted;
(2) such option is granted within 10 years from the date such plan is adopted,
or the date such plan is approved by the stockholders, whichever is earlier;
(3) such option by its terms is not exercisable after the expiration of 10 years
from the date such option is granted;
(4) the option price is not less than the fair market value of the stock at the
time such option is granted;
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in corporate stock as well as cash, corporate officers had a greater incentive
to see not just profits rise, but corporate stock prices as well, which of
course directly increased the wealth of all investors. Further, incentive
stock options are taxed favorably for regular income tax purposes.
Qualifying incentive stock options are not taxed when granted or
exercised.213 Income or loss is not reported until the stock is sold. If the
stock is acquired by the exercise of the incentive stock options is held for
more than one year after acquisition and more than two years after the
incentive stock option is granted, there will be a long-term capital gain or
loss on the sale equal to the difference between selling price of the stock in
the option price paid when the incentive stock option is exercised. If the
incentive stock option is sold before meeting the one-year and two-year
holding period tests, a gain on the sale is generally treated as ordinary
income to the extent of the excess of the value of the stock when incentive
stock option is exercised over the option price. Any gain in excess of this
“option spread” is reported as capital gain. Thus, executives could defer
taxes on their compensation until the underlying stock was sold years later,
and then they would be taxed at lower, long-term capital gains rates rather
than at ordinary income tax rates. However, if the FMV of the stock for
which incentive stock options may first be exercised in a particular year by
an employee exceeds $100,000, the excess is not considered a qualifying
incentive stock option.214 Incentive stock options might also possibly
produce a substantial liability for alternative minimum tax.215
Mathematically, this multiplied the incentive to produce fraudulent
income statements. An officer who made a base salary plus a hefty 10% of
net income performance bonus would, at a 45% ordinary federal and state
tax rate, be left with an incentive equal to 5.5% of net income after tax for
the year. An officer who made a base salary plus incentive stock options of
(5) such option by its terms is not transferable by such individual otherwise
than by will or the laws of descent and distribution, and is exercisable, during
his lifetime, only by him; and
(6) such individual, at the time the option is granted, does not own stock
possessing more than 10 percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock of the employer corporation or of its parent or subsidiary
corporation.
Such term shall not include any option if (as of the time the option is granted)
the terms of such option provide that it will not be treated as an incentive
stock option.
Id.
213. I.R.C. § 421(a) (2012).
214. I.R.C. § 422(d).
215. I.R.C. § 56(b)(3) (2012).
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similar projected net present value now would not be taxed on the stock
options now and those stock options would not be an expense on the
corporation’s income statement. The stock price, which was loosely a
multiplier of earnings per share (EPS), would rise faster without this
performance compensation deduction. The value of the stock options
would rise with the stock price, and tax on this increase was deferred until
the stock option was exercised and the subsequent stock was sold. So, if
that officer received a 10% bonus in incentive stock options, and the EPS
was 25 times, and the tax rate was cut to $0 now, 20% in the future, the
incentive to keep stock prices high was much greater than under the cash
bonus option.
Further, during the 1990s and early 2000s, stock options were
frequently equal to or exceeded the corporate officer’s salary.216 That is,
rather than being paid primarily for a corporate officer’s work input, the
value of the corporate officer’s compensation and net wealth was largely
based on an increase in stock prices, of which the net income of the
corporation was the primary factor under the corporate officer’s control.217
This created a new environment (not historically considered in the
development of state theft law) where corporate officers whose corporate
net income was otherwise not meeting market expectations would have an
incentive, for their own personal gain and the gain of the corporation of
which they were an agent, to produce fraudulent financial statements. The
intent would be to deceive investors—all potential investors, not just
specific investors—into paying more for the corporate stock so that the
corporate officers’ wealth increased. This increased wealth could be
locked in with the sale of the stock at the officer’s convenience, even where
the officer had inside knowledge.
The intent was also to deceive brokers into feeding investments into
the purchase of corporate stock, whether that stock be a new issuance or
purchased from the open market, so long as the stock price remained
(artificially) high so that officer wealth was maximized.218 The strategy
worked this way: the appearance of a strong company financial

216. See STEVEN BALSAM, ECON. POLICY INST., TAXES AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
9–10 (2012), http://www.epi.org/publication/taxes-executive-compensation/ [http://
perma.cc/9GHF-569X].
217. See Steven Balsam & David Ryan, The Effect of Internal Revenue Code Section
162(m) on the Issuance of Stock Options, in 18 ADVANCES IN TAXATION 3, 3 (Suzanne
Luttman ed., 2008) (“The results of this study show that the propensity to issue stock
options has increased for affected executives as a percentage of total compensation.
Additional analysis suggests that this increase in stock-option compensation is substituting
for lower increases in salary for affected executives . . . .”).
218. ENRON: THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM (Magnolia Home Entertainment 2005).
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performance boosted stock prices in the open market, even if that
appearance was inaccurate. All stockholders benefited while stock prices
were high, including manager-stockholders; but, manager-stockholders had
an advantage: they could issue fraudulent financial statements if they were
disappointed in actual financial results, keeping the value of their company
stock high, and they could sell their shares at the artificially high price and
exit the market before the market discovered the fraud.
Thus,
manager-stockholders could profit from the fraud at the expense of other
investors in the market who bought the stock at artificially inflated prices.
These investors, individually and in the aggregate, would lose money upon
the discovery of the manager-stockholders’ fraudulent statements,
regardless of whether they had purchased their stock from the company
directly or from an intermediary, as management conspired to build their
own wealth.
The law is settled that this circumstance is a fraud.219 State laws have
not yet evolved to recognize the sophisticated, twice-removed intent to
deprive another of their property. Unlike a corporation defrauding an
investor directly, a corporate officer in his capacity as an agent uses the
corporation to deceive the market, with the intent to take property from
investors to maintain an inflated market price for personal gain. The
privity is not as direct, but it is there. And, it is time for the law to evolve
with the circumstance for the purpose of furthering justice.
E. Why Now?
The recent convergence of at least three factors justifies a federal
definition of theft from fraud for nationally and internationally traded
securities. First, the size and sophistication of frauds perpetrated by
companies increases the cost to society of not correcting the broker versus
non-broker inequity.220 That is, the frauds appear to have gotten more
complex over the last fifty years. Second, brokerages provide more
convenient services than they historically have, which allows for wider use
of brokerages.221 It is often difficult for small investors to piecemeal a
balanced portfolio by buying directly from publicly-traded companies. By
buying through a brokerage, all stocks can be organized on one statement.

219. See, e.g., United States v. Martoma, 48 F. Supp. 3d 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
220. Keeping Up with Fraud Sophistication: How to Leverage Advanced Analytics, SAS,
http://www.sas.com/reg/gen/corp/765251 [http://perma.cc/PMJ3-BPJ5] (last visited Mar.
11, 2016).
221. Selena Maranjian, The Online Stock Broker: A Great Way to Invest, MOTLEY FOOL
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.fool.com/investing/brokerage/2014/02/10/the-online-stockbroker-a-great-way-to-invest.aspx [https://perma.cc/5Y7Y-NHBY?type=source].
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Online brokerages make trading convenient, and brokerages must now
generally provide tax basis as well as proceeds information to taxpayers
when they sell their stock.222 In short, the stockbrokers absorb some of the
accounting for the stock, which is more convenient than having to
independently obtain this information from (presumably multiple)
corporations. Finally, securities law has evolved faster than its income tax
theft loss counterpart.223 Ceteris paribus: these two sets of federal law
should be largely harmonized. All of these factors had not evolved quickly
enough to warrant a sense of immediacy until recently. Since the turn of
this century the number and size of frauds should inspire the realization
that there is an inequity in the tax treatment, and in action to correct this
inequity.
III. CASES SINCE GOELLER
Pursuing a fraud loss through district courts may continue to produce
a ruling contrary to this argument and that of the Goeller decision because
district courts rely on the individual state definitions of theft, which in turn
rely on privity (whereas federal or the plain meaning of theft do not). For
example, in Adkins v. United States,224 the plaintiffs legitimately suffered
an uncontested $2,336,895.58 fraud loss from a pump-and-dump scheme
through a local broker-dealer, Donald & Co. Securities, Inc. [Donald &
Co.], but claimed an additional $239,062.61 that the IRS disputed met the
qualifications for a fraud loss.225 The IRS argued that there was a lack of
privity between the fraudster and the investor, or, if meeting the criteria for
being a fraud loss, it did not meet the requirements in the year the fraud
loss was claimed.226
Adkins contended that $194,062.61 of the
$239,062.61 loss on three securities (My Turn, Tera Computer Co., and
Great Train Store Co.) was a fraud loss because, while the securities were
purchased through a third party. They were purchased on the advice of
Donald & Co.227 Adkins contended that the remaining $45,000 was
supposed to be a return of capital originally sent to an underwriter (thus not
credited to Adkins’ Donald & Co. account) for the purchase of a Vianet
IPO stock issue that turned out to be oversubscribed and thus not
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
224. Adkins v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 797 (2013).
225. Id. at 804.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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purchased.228 Instead of being returned to Adkins by the underwriter, that
$45,000 was retained and a different $45,000 check was mailed to Adkins
and debited to the Donald & Co. account.229 Both parties sought summary
judgments for their positions.230
In reaffirming that the “the perpetrator must have had the specific
intent to deprive the victim of his property,”231 Judge Sweeney cited
Goeller, stating “[m]ost courts analyzing whether a particular criminal act
constitutes a theft for the purposes of IRS Sc. 165 refer to state law, but in a
recent decision, the Honorable Francis M. Allegra of this court determined
that the definition of theft should be derived from federal common law.”232
Judge Sweeney went on to state that direct privity between the perpetrator
and the victim must be present for a fraud loss to be taken.233 While
Donald & Co. manipulated the price of the stocks purchased by Adkins, the
third-party brokers were not involved in the manipulation itself, and they
were the party that received the funds from Adkins directly.234 Adkins
asserted that since they were merely following the advice of a Donald &
Co. broker when they purchased from the third-party brokers, and because
Donald & Co. was the perpetrator of the pump-and-dump fraud, Donald &
Co. affirmatively intended to deprive Adkins of the investment.235 Here,
the judge refused to grant summary judgment, saying that there is no
requirement that an investor have direct contact with the entity in which he
is investing.236
The remaining two stock purchases, Tera Computer Co. and Great
Train Store Co., were made solely on the advice of third-party brokers, and
as such, the judge ruled that there was no privity between Adkins and
Donald & Co. with respect to these purchases.237 Accordingly, the judge
granted the IRS’ request for summary judgment against taking a theft loss
for these purchases.238

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 800.
Id. at 806.
Id.
Id. at 804.
Id. at 804 n.9.
Id. at 804.
Id. at 805.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 804–06.
Id. at 806.
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There was conflicting evidence regarding the final $45,000 for the
IPO, for which summary judgment was denied. 239 Ironically, on April 5,
2011, an appeals officer concluded that Adkins had sustained a theft loss of
$2,532,996.01—very close to the $2,336,895.58 Adkins originally
sought—but because Adkins had previously filed suit in the United States
Court of Federal Claims on December 10, 2010, that decision was void.240
The opinion of the appeals officer, while not authoritative, may indicate a
somewhat sympathetic interpretation for victims of fraud loss at a federal
level that does not otherwise meet the definition of a fraud loss at a state
level.
Another example was presented in United States v. Elsass,241 in which
the United States brought suit against a tax preparer and his companies to
enjoin them from providing services to taxpayers on the grounds that
defendants had frequently violated tax laws.242 The defendant, Elsass, was
an attorney whose law license was suspended in 1998.243 The suspension
was in part because of “repeated acts of dishonesty, deceit, and failure to
abide by [the Supreme Court of Ohio]’s orders.”244 Recognizing the added
value of a theft loss for tax purposes over a capital loss, Elsass opened two
wholly-owned companies that he promoted as having an expertise in theft
loss, Fraud Recovery Group, Inc. (FRG) and Sensible Tax Services, Inc.
(STS).245 Elsass and his companies marketed to investors that they were in
the business of helping taxpayers claim tax refunds through tax deductions
for theft losses arising from investment scams like Ponzi schemes.246 The
business marketed to potential victims of investment fraud losses and
assisted them in filing amended tax returns, taking approximately 15% of
the resultant income tax refund.247 They were accused of attempting “to
obtain theft-loss deductions for their customers in instances where doing so
[was] improper or altogether groundless.”248 Generally, they took theft
239. Principal Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 82, 108 (2014) (citing
Goeller v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 534, 539 (2013)) (stating that a taxpayer must prove
the existence and amount of a claimed loss under I.R.C. § 165). This is undisputed and
tangential to this article.
240. Adkins, 113 Fed. Cl. at 803.
241. United States v. Elsass, 796 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2014).
242. Id. at 391.
243. Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Elsass, 713 N.E.2d 421, 421 (Ohio 1999). It should be
noted that Elsass was the same person who represented the plaintiff in Goeller. Goeller v.
United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 534, 538 (2013).
244. Columbus Bar Ass’n, 713 N.E.2d at 425.
245. Elsass, 796 F.3d at 390.
246. Id. at 392.
247. Id.
248. United States v. Elsass, 978 F. Supp. 2d 901, 907 (S.D. Ohio 2013).
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losses where not all the criteria for doing so were met, or sometimes as a
“for AGI” deduction where a “from AGI” deduction was indicated or
where a capital loss was indicated instead of a theft loss.249
In one set of losses, Elsass deducted losses from investments in
American Business Financial Services, which sold high-interest, subprime
mortgage-backed securities.250 Fraud was never proven, and at the time
Elsass deducted the losses, the amount of the expected recovery—including
the possible recovery of all losses—was uncertain. The district court found
that Elsass and FRG demonstrated reckless disregard for the criminality
and distorted pertinent information on hundreds of returns by insisting that
2005 was the proper year of discovery.251 This behavior continued after the
IRS issued disallowances of this theft loss to individual taxpayers and/or
FRG employees. As of December 2009, FRG had filed 168 theft loss
claims after the first IRS notice of disallowance.252 The IRS sent 137
notices of disallowance to FRG and its taxpayers overall.253 While it
appeared as though FRG clung to 2005 dogmatically in filing theft losses
for ABFS investors, they seemed to have been ethically negotiable; an
internal FRG document discovered by the government listed ABFS losses
as occurring in 2005 with a note that “Per Toby this can be put in ‘06 if it
works better.”254 That is, whether the loss was a theft loss is questionable
at best, but in any case, it was not a theft loss in the year(s) indicated by
FRG.
In a second set of loss claims, FRG deducted losses from a
documented Ponzi scheme, but willfully and/or recklessly filed the theft
loss claims using 2004 as the year of discovery, which was several years
before the amount of partial investor recovery was determinable.255 FRG
continued to market 2004 as the year of the theft loss to potential clients
even after the IRS determined that 2004 was premature for a determination
that there would be no further recovery.256
In a third group of filings, FRG claimed theft losses where a mortgage
broker used investors’ money for specific real property purchases in
exchange for monthly interest payments.257 When the housing market
failed, the mortgage broker declared bankruptcy and investors became
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Elsass, 796 F.3d at 393.
Id. at 392–93.
Id. at 396.
Elsass, 978 F. Supp. 2d at 919–20.
Id. at 919.
Id. at 920.
Id. at 921.
Id. at 920–22.
Id. at 924.
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owners through foreclosure of the properties in which they had invested.258
No criminal intent was proven, indicating that proper treatment of this
investment was a capital loss.259
FRG’s improper claims of theft losses were complicated by how the
theft losses were claimed. Repeatedly, “when customers’ losses could not
be extended forward or backward, Elsass instructed employees . . . to use
Form 4797 for the purpose of entitling the customer to additional
deductions or state refunds through lowered AGI.”260 The court called this
“‘shopping’ between claiming the theft loss above versus below the
line.”261 In one instance, Elsass issued instructions to process a tax return
“as a 4797 if its [sic] better,”262 and in another instance claimed a “sold”
date of November 30, 2005 on an ABFS investment to make an improper
classification seem more proper. In a summary judgment, Elsass’ sale of a
material theft loss plan, consisting of fraudulent statements and
misrepresentations on the tax return that he had reason to know were false
or fraudulent, was determined to be an abusive tax shelter in violation of
IRC section 6700.263
Elsass appealed, relying heavily on the Goeller decision challenging
the district court’s finding that the theft loss deductions were improper and
that defendants were reckless in claiming them.264 Further, Elsass asserted
that the district court should have relied on the federal claims court’s
definition of theft.265 The defendants did not dispute that they engaged in
other prohibited practices, including inflating the tax refunds by taking
casualty losses “above the line” that should be taken “below the line,”
claiming theft loss deductions for losses incurred by taxpayers’ deceased
relatives, negotiating taxpayer refund checks, misrepresenting his eligibility
258. Id.
259. Id. at 924–25.
260. Id. at 929.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 936. Additionally, Elsass and FRG employees negotiated at least 510 refund
checks in violation of I.R.C. section 6695(f), and continued to negotiate checks after the
lawsuit was filed against them in District Court. Id. at 931. Elsass misrepresented his
eligibility to practice before the IRS as an attorney in good standing, and possibly
committed perjury on several Form 2848 “Declaration of Representative” forms. Id. at 940.
The court found that “FRG’s use of contingent fees only amplifies [the risk of continuance],
as it creates an incentive to aggressively pursue theft-loss claims regardless of the claims’
underlying merits.” Id. Correspondingly, the District Court issued permanent injunctive
relief. Id. at 941.
264. United States v. Elsass, 769 F.3d 390, 394 (6th Cir. 2014).
265. Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 21–35, United States v. Elsass, 769 F.3d 390 (6th
Cir. 2014) (No. 13-4358).
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to practice before the Internal Revenue Service, and making false or
fraudulent statements pertaining to the allowability of deductions, that in
themselves would warrant an injunction.266 The appellate court thus upheld
the injunction and declined to consider the propriety of the theft loss
deductions as it pertained to propriety of the district court’s injunction.
“We note, however, that defendants’ primary argument—that the district
court applied an incorrect definition of ‘theft’—is, in any event,
meritless.”267 The appellate court notes that the district court located in the
Sixth Circuit relied on both the state law definition and also the Fifth
Circuit’s definition of theft as “intended to cover and covering any criminal
appropriation of another’s property to the use of the taker, particularly
including theft by swindling, false pretenses, and any other form of
guile.”268
Generally, one federal court of appeals is not bound to follow the
decisions of other courts of appeals. Relying on previous circuit rulings—
even where circuits themselves conflict—is consistent with stare decisis.
The federal tax court, for example, will conform to the appellate court
rulings of a particular jurisdiction even if it disagrees with the holding,
under the Golsen rule.269 Thus, the judge in Elsass did not analyze whether
federal law, as applied in the Goeller decision, could be the basis for use of
the theft loss deduction. Four reasons for this were given. First, relying on
Alioto,270 the appellate court asserted that under the established law of the
Sixth Circuit, “[w]hether a ‘theft’ has occurred for purposes of Section 165
is determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the theft took place.”271
Second, the district court did not rely solely on the state law definition of
theft, but also used the Fifth Circuit’s broad definition of theft.272 Third,
the court ruled that by not stating any distinction between the federal and
state definitions of theft, Elsass forfeited the argument that federal law
should apply.273 Finally—and according to the court most importantly—
even if the district court had relied on Goeller, “there [was] no indication
that the outcome would have been any different”274 because in two of the
three sets of losses, no criminal intent was found, and in the third, the
presence of the theft loss was undisputed; it was the amount, timing and
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id.
Elsass, 769 F.3d at 392.
Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1956).
See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 756–57 (1970).
Alioto v. Commissioner, 699 F.3d 948, 955 (6th Cir. 2012).
Elsass, 769 F.3d at 397 (citing Alioto, 699 F.3d at 955).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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placement of the theft loss that was in dispute.275 By finding that there was
no basis in fact for adopting the argument, the court did not have to get into
an analysis, similar to the one in the Goeller case, of whether federal law
should apply.
Instead, the court relied on stare decisis within the Sixth Circuit. By
pointing out that the “most important”276 reason for ruling the way it did
was that the outcome would not have changed, perhaps the court was
signaling that that analysis would be saved for a future case in which the
federal definition of theft would conflict with the state’s, alternatively
permitting or denying a theft loss claim. Until that time, litigants may be
enticed by what appears to be an advantage to claiming a theft under
federal law, resulting in an issue of forum shopping because the case may
be brought in the United States Court of Federal Claims instead of the
jurisdiction in which the loss occurred.
In Greenberger v. United States,277 a federal district judge denied a
theft loss deduction in connection with a stock where the company’s former
executives were convicted of a pump-and-dump securities fraud.278 The
court noted that “theft, [as used in section 165], is a ‘word of general and
broad connotation, intending to cover...any criminal appropriation of
another’s property to the use of the taker, particularly including theft by
swindling, false pretenses, and other forms of guile.’”279 Quoting Elsass as
Sixth Circuit precedent, the court relied on the state law of Ohio, which
was where the theft took place.280 The court found that in Ohio, “criminal
theft statues require privity between perpetrator and victim in order to
establish that the perpetrator has a specific intent to deprive the particular
victim.”281 Because the taxpayers bought the shares on the open market
rather than directly from the entity or wrongdoers, intent to take their
property was not proven.282
The court then examined the state law definition of “theft offense.”283
While the Ohio Supreme Court has held that securities fraud is a theft
offense, the district court found that the definition of “theft offense” was a
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Greenberger v. United States, No. 1:14-CV-01041, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80643
(N.D. Ohio June 19, 2015).
278. Id. at 4.
279. Id. at 14 (alteration in original) (quoting Elsass, 769 F.3d at 397 and Edwards v.
Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1956)).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 15–16 (quoting Schroerlucke v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 584, 598 (2011)).
282. Id. at 17.
283. Id. at 27–30.
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term of convenience used in the Ohio Revised Code for a variety of
purposes.284 Because the term “theft offense” is not itself a substantive
crime, the district court rejected this term as a standard for theft loss
because “almost any deceptive act or practice that has an effect in Ohio
could be the basis for claiming a theft-loss deduction . . . [which] goes
against the mandate that tax deductions are to be construed narrowly.”285
CONCLUSION
State laws have not evolved to recognize the refined and remote intent
to deprive another of their property. Today, rather than corporations
defrauding an investor directly, corporate officers in their capacity as
agents use corporations to deceive the market with the intent to take
property from investors to maintain an inflated market price for personal
gain. The privity is not as direct, but, we argue, it is there.
Congress should allow a theft loss deduction in an amendment to IRC
section 165(c) where a stockbroker or other intermediary was used,
provided that all other provisions supporting a theft loss are met. Congress
could also delegate the writing of a revenue regulation to the Internal
Revenue Service.
In the meantime, courts could give deliberate
consideration in each case as to whether the federal common law serves as
a better and more consistent basis than state law for the determination of
theft losses where intermediaries are used. By applying a plain meaning to
securities cases where an intermediary served as a conduit to the purchase
of securities and the underlying corporation was committing fraud, greater
equity among geographic victims and greater equity among investors (the
smaller of whom often cannot easily buy stocks directly from a
corporation) could be achieved, with the side benefit of a lesser
administrative burden for the courts in multistate cases. Due to the
inequities both in opportunity and in result, it is time for the law to evolve
for the purpose of furthering justice.

284. Id. at 29.
285. Id. at 30.
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